All compounded things are impermanent.
When one perceives this with wisdom,
one turns away from suffering.—Dhammapada
Having established that souls do not exist, we now examine the implications for afterlife and reincarnation.
Definition 5.1 (Afterlife). An afterlife is a mode of existence for a person following the death of their physical body.45
Theorem 5.2 (No Afterlife Without Souls). If there are no souls, there is no afterlife (in any sense that involves the survival of the person).
Proof. For there to be an afterlife for person \(P\), something of \(P\) must survive \(P\)’s bodily death. What could this be?
Case 1: The body. The body does not survive death (by definition of death). Even if resurrected, the resurrected body is a new body, not the old body surviving.
Case 2: The soul. But we have shown that souls do not exist (Chapter 3, Corollary 3.1). So the soul cannot survive because there is no soul.
Case 3: Some pattern or information. Perhaps what survives is not a substance (body or soul) but a pattern—memories, personality, relationships encoded somehow.
But for me to survive, it is not enough that a pattern like mine continues to exist. If my memories are uploaded to a computer after my death, the computer simulation is not me—it is at best a copy, a representation, a memorial. I do not experience what it experiences; I am not benefited by its pleasures or harmed by its pains.
Moreover, such patterns are not agents with free will; they evolve according to whatever computational or causal laws govern them. So even if we call them “persons,” they cannot do the work that souls were supposed to do.
Case 4: Nothing. If nothing of \(P\) survives \(P\)’s death, then there is no afterlife for \(P\).
Therefore, in every case, there is no afterlife in any sense that involves the survival of the person with agency and moral status intact. ◻
Definition 5.3 (Reincarnation). Reincarnation is the process by which a soul or essential aspect of personal identity passes from one body to another at or after death.46
Theorem 5.4 (No Reincarnation Without Souls). If there are no souls, reincarnation is impossible.
Proof. Reincarnation requires something to transmigrate from body to body. What could this be?
Case 1: A substantial soul (ātman, jīva, etc.). But souls do not exist (Chapter 3). So this cannot transmigrate.
Case 2: Consciousness. But consciousness, as shown in Chapter 3, is not a substance that can move from place to place; it is a process arising from physical (or, hypothetically, spiritual) conditions. When the brain dies, the consciousness dependent on it ceases. Even if another consciousness arises elsewhere, it is a new consciousness, not the old one relocated.
Case 3: Memories and personality. These are encoded in the brain. When the brain dies, they are destroyed. Even if, by some mechanism, they were transferred to another brain, this would be copying, not transmigration—and the result would not be me surviving but a copy of me being created.
Case 4: Karmic imprints. This is the Buddhist approach: what transmigrates is not a soul but a bundle of karmic tendencies, a causal continuity without substantial identity.
But this does not constitute reincarnation of a person. If there is no self that is reborn, then “I” am not reborn. As the Buddhist tradition itself acknowledges, the one who is born is “neither the same as” nor “different from” the one who died—a continuity of process but not of personal identity.47
Therefore, reincarnation in the sense of a person being reborn is impossible. ◻
Theorem 5.5 (Interest in Afterlife/Reincarnation Depends on Personal Identity). Afterlife and reincarnation are of interest to a person \(P\) only if \(P\) is numerically identical to the one who experiences them.
Proof. Consider the alternatives:
Case 1: Numerical identity. If I am numerically identical to the one who goes to heaven/hell or is reborn, then what happens to that one happens to me. I have prudential reason to care.
Case 2: Qualitative similarity but not numerical identity. If the one who goes to heaven is merely similar to me (same memories, personality, etc.) but not numerically identical, then that one’s experiences are not my experiences. This is the same as a twin’s experiences: however similar the twin, their pleasures are not my pleasures, their pains are not my pains.
Case 3: Mere causal connection. If the connection is merely causal (my present actions influence the future being’s circumstances), this is no different from my present actions influencing my future children or others: a reason for moral concern, perhaps, but not a reason for prudential self-interest.
Therefore, the distinctive interest in afterlife/reincarnation—the hope for my survival—depends on numerical identity, which requires a persisting self, which does not exist. ◻
Corollary 5.6. Afterlife and reincarnation, even if they occurred, would be of no personal interest to us, since the requisite numerical identity is impossible without a persisting self.