The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction: jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.
—Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion
The nonexistence of souls and free will has profound implications for theology, particularly for the God of the Bible conceived as a moral governor who rewards and punishes.
Theorem 6.1 (No Subjects Without Souls). If there are no souls, there are no subjects for divine judgment.
Proof. Divine judgment presupposes a subject to be judged—a person who performed the deeds for which they are rewarded or punished, and who experiences the reward or punishment.
If there are no souls, then there is no metaphysically robust “person” who persists from the time of the deed to the time of judgment, and no one who experiences the consequences.
The atoms that composed the “sinner” have dispersed; the neural patterns have changed; the subjective stream of consciousness has altered. What remains is at best a causal descendant, not a numerically identical person. Judging the descendant for the ancestor’s deeds is no more just than judging a child for their parent’s crimes.48
Therefore, without souls, divine judgment has no proper object. ◻
Theorem 6.2 (No Desert Without Free Will). If there is no free will, then no one deserves reward or punishment.
Proof. Desert requires that the agent could have done otherwise. We do not blame the epileptic for damage caused during a seizure, or the sleepwalker for actions performed unconsciously, precisely because they could not have done otherwise.
If no one has free will, then no one could ever have done otherwise. Every “choice” was determined by prior causes or was random.
Punishing someone for an action they could not have avoided is like punishing a river for flowing downhill—it is arbitrary cruelty, not justice.
Similarly, rewarding someone for a “good deed” they were determined or randomly caused to perform is empty: the person did not merit the reward, for merit requires that one could have done otherwise.
Therefore, without free will, the concepts of desert, reward, and punishment lose their moral foundation. ◻
Corollary 6.3 (Divine Justice Impossible). If there is no free will, God cannot justly reward or punish.
Proof. By Theorem 6.2, without free will, no one deserves reward or punishment. A just God, by definition, gives people what they deserve. But if no one deserves anything, a just God can give no one anything qua deserved. Therefore, divine justice (reward and punishment according to desert) is impossible. ◻
Theorem 6.4 (God’s Existence Has No Practical Consequence). If there is no free will, then whether God exists has no practical consequence for us.
Proof. Consider the traditional reasons to care whether God exists:
Hope of reward: But we cannot deserve reward without free will, so there is no hope that merits hoping.
Fear of punishment: But we cannot deserve punishment without free will, so there is no fear that is warranted.
Gratitude for grace: But grace, if it comes to us, was not accepted by us (since we have no free will); we had no choice in the matter. Gratitude for what one could not refuse is empty.
Moral guidance: But if we have no free will, we cannot choose to follow moral guidance. We will do what the causal chain determines, regardless of what guidance exists.
Meaning and purpose: But meaning and purpose presuppose a self that can pursue them, which does not exist.
Therefore, none of the traditional reasons to care about God’s existence apply without free will. God’s existence or nonexistence makes no difference to our situation.49 ◻